Ville Korpela
PhD, M.Sc.
vipeko@utu.fi +358 29 450 4107 +358 50 320 0578 Rehtorinpellonkatu 3 Turku |
Mechanism Design; Game Theory; Social Choice
I am interested in all aspects of mechanism design. Currently, I am working with problems related to behavioral mechanism design, particularly on questions of coalition formation between biased agents, and trying to solve what can be implemented in cooperative solution concepts like the vNM stable set. You can access most of my published papers, as well as some ongoing work, from the links above.
Semester 2024-2025: Advanced Microeconomic Theory I (KTS20), Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (KTS22).
- Two-player rationalizable implementation (2025)
- Journal of Economic Theory
- The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view (2024)
- Economic Theory
- Behavioral strong implementation (2023)
- Economic Theory
- Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities (2023)
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility (2023)
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Yritystuet ja mekanismin suunnittelu: Taustaraportti yritystukien tutkimusjaoston vuosiraporttia 2022 varten (2022) Korpela Ville
- Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures (2021)
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation (2020)
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions? (2020)
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information (2018)
- Journal of Mathematical Economics
- All deceptions are not alike: Bayesian mechanism design with a social norm against lying (2017)
- Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals (2014)
- Social Choice and Welfare
- A Simple Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementation (2013)
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Implementation without Rationality Assumptions (2012)
- Theory and Decision
- Nash implementation theory - A note on full characterizations (2010)
- Economics Letters
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