Two-player rationalizable implementation




Jain, Ritesh; Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele

PublisherElsevier

2025

 Journal of Economic Theory

227

0022-0531

1095-7235

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2025.106031

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053125000778?via%3Dihub

https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/491940740



The paper characterizes the class of two-player social choice functions implementable in rationalizable strategies under complete information.




game theory


Ritesh Jain greatly acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Science and Technology Grant, Taiwan under the grant: 107-2410-H-001-113-MY2.


Last updated on 23/05/2025 09:15:14 AM