Ville Korpela
PhD, M.Sc.
vipeko@utu.fi +358 29 450 4107 +358 50 320 0578 Rehtorinpellonkatu 3 Turku |
Areas of expertise
Mechanism Design; Game Theory; Social Choice
Mechanism Design; Game Theory; Social Choice
Research
I am interested in all aspects of mechanism design. Currently, I am working with problems related to behavioral mechanism design, particularly on questions of coalition formation between biased agents, and trying to solve what can be implemented in cooperative solution concepts like the vNM stable set. You can access most of my published papers, as well as some ongoing work, from the links above.
Teaching
Semester 2024-2025: Advanced Microeconomic Theory I (KTS20), Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (KTS22).
Publications
- Two-player rationalizable implementation (2025)
- Journal of Economic Theory
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view (2024)
- Economic Theory
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Behavioral strong implementation (2023)
- Economic Theory
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities (2023)
- Games and Economic Behavior
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility (2023)
- International Journal of Game Theory
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Yritystuet ja mekanismin suunnittelu: Taustaraportti yritystukien tutkimusjaoston vuosiraporttia 2022 varten (2022) Korpela Ville
(D4 Published development or research report or study ) - Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures (2021)
- Games and Economic Behavior
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation (2020)
- Games and Economic Behavior
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions? (2020)
- Journal of Economic Theory
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Procedurally fair implementation under complete information (2018)
- Journal of Mathematical Economics
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - All deceptions are not alike: Bayesian mechanism design with a social norm against lying (2017)
- Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals (2014)
- Social Choice and Welfare
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - A Simple Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementation (2013)
- Journal of Economic Theory
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Implementation without Rationality Assumptions (2012)
- Theory and Decision
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal) - Nash implementation theory - A note on full characterizations (2010)
- Economics Letters
(A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal)
UTU Research Portal