A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
Authors: Korpela Ville, Lombardi Michele, Vartiainen Hannu
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2021
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.007
Web address : https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825621000567
Self-archived copy’s web address: https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/54711763
The designer's exercise consists of designing a rights structure that
formalizes the idea of power distribution in society. A solution is
implementable in largest consistent set by a rights structure if there
exists a rights structure such that for each preference profile, the
largest consistent set of the game played by agents coincides with the
set of outcomes that the solution would select for it. In a setting with
transfers, every Maskin monotonic solution is implementable. This
finding implies that the class of implementable solutions in core
equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning.
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