A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
Authors: Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2020
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Journal acronym: Games Econ Behav
Volume: 121
First page : 108
Last page: 116
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.006
Web address : https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562030021X
Self-archived copy’s web address: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/210678/7/210678.pdf
We study the relationship between the two-agent implementation problem and the concept of interim efficiency of Holmström and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environments with private values and independent types. We present a general property, called closure under interim utility equivalence,
and show it is sufficient for the implementation of social choice
functions. This condition, when combined with another property, called interim inseparability,
is also sufficient for the implementation of essentially single-valued
social choice sets. The characterization results are then examined in a
variety of environments.
