The Explanatory Gap: Progress and Problems

: Revonsuo Antti

Publisher: American Psychological Association

: Washington

: 2021

: Psychology of consciousness: theory, research and practice

: PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS-THEORY RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

: PSYCHOL CONSCIOUS

: 8

: 1

: 91

: 94

: 4

: 2326-5531

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000271

In the target article, Klein (2021) argues that current science, because of its commitment to a restrictive physicalist metaphysics, will not be able to solve the hard problem. The message seems to be rather pessimistic: Unless the science of consciousness finds an alternative metaphysical basis that embraces the qualitative, subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness, there will be little if any true progress made in explaining consciousness scientifically. In this commentary, I present a more optimistic view: For now, the science of consciousness can still make progress in explaining consciousness even without resorting to any radical metaphysical changes to the scientific worldview. But if future neuroscience fails to discover the true neural constituents of consciousness in the brain, and the explanatory gap thereby remains wide open, then the science of consciousness might be forced to reconsider its metaphysical commitments.