B1 Non-refereed article in a scientific journal
The Explanatory Gap: Progress and Problems
Authors: Revonsuo Antti
Publisher: American Psychological Association
Publishing place: Washington
Publication year: 2021
Journal: Psychology of consciousness: theory, research and practice
Journal name in source: PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS-THEORY RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
Journal acronym: PSYCHOL CONSCIOUS
Volume: 8
Issue: 1
First page : 91
Last page: 94
Number of pages: 4
eISSN: 2326-5531
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000271
Abstract
In the target article, Klein (2021) argues that current science, because of its commitment to a restrictive physicalist metaphysics, will not be able to solve the hard problem. The message seems to be rather pessimistic: Unless the science of consciousness finds an alternative metaphysical basis that embraces the qualitative, subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness, there will be little if any true progress made in explaining consciousness scientifically. In this commentary, I present a more optimistic view: For now, the science of consciousness can still make progress in explaining consciousness even without resorting to any radical metaphysical changes to the scientific worldview. But if future neuroscience fails to discover the true neural constituents of consciousness in the brain, and the explanatory gap thereby remains wide open, then the science of consciousness might be forced to reconsider its metaphysical commitments.
In the target article, Klein (2021) argues that current science, because of its commitment to a restrictive physicalist metaphysics, will not be able to solve the hard problem. The message seems to be rather pessimistic: Unless the science of consciousness finds an alternative metaphysical basis that embraces the qualitative, subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness, there will be little if any true progress made in explaining consciousness scientifically. In this commentary, I present a more optimistic view: For now, the science of consciousness can still make progress in explaining consciousness even without resorting to any radical metaphysical changes to the scientific worldview. But if future neuroscience fails to discover the true neural constituents of consciousness in the brain, and the explanatory gap thereby remains wide open, then the science of consciousness might be forced to reconsider its metaphysical commitments.