B1 Vertaisarvioimaton kirjoitus tieteellisessä lehdessä
The Explanatory Gap: Progress and Problems
Tekijät: Revonsuo Antti
Kustantaja: American Psychological Association
Kustannuspaikka: Washington
Julkaisuvuosi: 2021
Journal: Psychology of consciousness: theory, research and practice
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimi: PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS-THEORY RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
Lehden akronyymi: PSYCHOL CONSCIOUS
Vuosikerta: 8
Numero: 1
Aloitussivu: 91
Lopetussivu: 94
Sivujen määrä: 4
eISSN: 2326-5531
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000271
Tiivistelmä
In the target article, Klein (2021) argues that current science, because of its commitment to a restrictive physicalist metaphysics, will not be able to solve the hard problem. The message seems to be rather pessimistic: Unless the science of consciousness finds an alternative metaphysical basis that embraces the qualitative, subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness, there will be little if any true progress made in explaining consciousness scientifically. In this commentary, I present a more optimistic view: For now, the science of consciousness can still make progress in explaining consciousness even without resorting to any radical metaphysical changes to the scientific worldview. But if future neuroscience fails to discover the true neural constituents of consciousness in the brain, and the explanatory gap thereby remains wide open, then the science of consciousness might be forced to reconsider its metaphysical commitments.
In the target article, Klein (2021) argues that current science, because of its commitment to a restrictive physicalist metaphysics, will not be able to solve the hard problem. The message seems to be rather pessimistic: Unless the science of consciousness finds an alternative metaphysical basis that embraces the qualitative, subjective nature of phenomenal consciousness, there will be little if any true progress made in explaining consciousness scientifically. In this commentary, I present a more optimistic view: For now, the science of consciousness can still make progress in explaining consciousness even without resorting to any radical metaphysical changes to the scientific worldview. But if future neuroscience fails to discover the true neural constituents of consciousness in the brain, and the explanatory gap thereby remains wide open, then the science of consciousness might be forced to reconsider its metaphysical commitments.