A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä
Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
Tekijät: Korpela Ville, Lombardi Michele, Vartiainen Hannu
Kustantaja: Elsevier
Julkaisuvuosi: 2021
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.007
Verkko-osoite: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825621000567
Rinnakkaistallenteen osoite: https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/54711763
The designer's exercise consists of designing a rights structure that
formalizes the idea of power distribution in society. A solution is
implementable in largest consistent set by a rights structure if there
exists a rights structure such that for each preference profile, the
largest consistent set of the game played by agents coincides with the
set of outcomes that the solution would select for it. In a setting with
transfers, every Maskin monotonic solution is implementable. This
finding implies that the class of implementable solutions in core
equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning.
Ladattava julkaisu This is an electronic reprint of the original article. |  |
