The nucleolus of large majority games



: Kurz S, Napel S, Nohn A

Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA

: 2014

: Economics Letters

: ECONOMICS LETTERS

: ECON LETT

: 123

: 2

: 139

: 143

: 5

: 0165-1765

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.041


Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal, and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,



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