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The nucleolus of large majority games
Tekijät: Kurz S, Napel S, Nohn A
Kustantaja: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Julkaisuvuosi: 2014
Journal: Economics Letters
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimi: ECONOMICS LETTERS
Lehden akronyymi: ECON LETT
Vuosikerta: 123
Numero: 2
Aloitussivu: 139
Lopetussivu: 143
Sivujen määrä: 5
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.041
Tiivistelmä
Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal, and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,
Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal, and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,
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