A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
The nucleolus of large majority games
Authors: Kurz S, Napel S, Nohn A
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Publication year: 2014
Journal: Economics Letters
Journal name in source: ECONOMICS LETTERS
Journal acronym: ECON LETT
Volume: 123
Issue: 2
First page : 139
Last page: 143
Number of pages: 5
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.041
Abstract
Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal, and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,
Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal, and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,
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