A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

In Defense of Causal Presentism




AuthorsVirmajoki Veli

PublisherThe University of Chicago Press

Publishing placeChicago

Publication year2022

JournalHopos

Journal name in sourceHOPOS-THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Journal acronymHOPOS

Volume12

Issue1

First page 68

Last page96

eISSN2156-6240

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/718993

Web address https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/718993

Self-archived copy’s web addresshttps://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/174870801


Abstract
In this article, I defend causal presentism in the historiography of science. In causal presentism, the historiography of science studies events, processes, and practices that were causally relevant to the development of the present science. I argue that causal presentism has three main virtues. First, causal presentism avoids the conceptual problems that the historiography of science has recognized at its core. Second, causal presentism provides a clear account of what counts as historical explanatory understanding about science. Third, causal presentism enables novel ways to address several conceptual and methodological problems in the historiography of science. The conclusion is that causal presentism is a distinctively strong position with respect to the historiography of science.

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Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 21:27