A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

Demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits: Realist social ontology for mental disorders




AuthorsKoi Polaris

PublisherTaylor & Francis

Publication year2022

JournalPhilosophical Psychology

Journal name in sourcePHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Journal acronymPHILOS PSYCHOL

Volume35

Issue6

First page 793

Last page813

Number of pages21

ISSN0951-5089

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.2016674

Self-archived copy’s web addresshttps://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/68614658


Abstract
Realists about mental disorder have been hasty about dismissing social explanations of how mental disorder is constituted. However, many social ontologies are realist ontologies. In order to create a meaningful distinction between realism and social metaphysics about mental disorder, I propose that realism about mental disorder is best understood as Individual Trait Realism (ITR) about them. For ITR, mental disorders exist in virtue of traits. I defend the view that ITR is compatible with social metaphysics, arguing that, in asking whether constituents in the social sphere figure the metaphysics of psychopathology, we are asking questions on three different strata of explanation: the strata of demarcation, instantiation, and individual traits. Distinguishing between these strata allows for nuanced realism that need not reject the social constitution of mental disorder.

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Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 22:05