A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

Intermediation in a directed search model




AuthorsKultti Klaus, Takalo Tuomas, Vähämaa Oskari

PublisherWILEY

Publication year2021

JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy

Journal name in sourceJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

Journal acronymJ ECON MANAGE STRAT

Number of pages16

ISSN1058-6407

eISSN1530-9134

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12413(external)

Web address https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jems.12413(external)

Self-archived copy’s web addresshttps://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/212428(external)


Abstract
We provide an example where establishing competitive coordination service platforms is so lucrative that they end up reducing welfare. We consider a canonical directed search model in which buyers have unit demands and sellers' capacity constraint leads to a coordination problem: in a symmetric equilibrium without intermediation some sellers receive too many and some too few buyers. We compare this equilibrium to one where sellers and buyers can choose to become intermediaries who coordinate the meetings. In this setup, roughly one-fifth of agents become intermediaries. As a result, a large part of the supply and demand in the economy vanishes. Moreover, the large amount of intermediaries actually reduces the meeting efficiency. Jointly, these effects imply that the gains from trade are lower than that in the economy without intermediation.



Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 16:45