A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

Force, Motion, and Leibniz’s Argument from Successiveness




AuthorsMyrdal Peter

PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH

Publishing placeBerlin

Publication year2021

JournalArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie

Volume103

Issue4

First page 704

Last page729

eISSN1613-0650

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-0088

Web address https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/agph-2018-0088/html

Self-archived copy’s web addresshttps://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/53057643


Abstract

This essay proposes a new interpretation of a central, and yet overlooked, argument Leibniz offers against Descartes’s power-free ontology of the corporeal world. Appealing to considerations about the successiveness of motion, Leibniz attempts to show that the reality of motion requires force. It is often assumed that the argument is driven by concerns inspired by Zeno. Against such a reading, this essay contends that Leibniz’s argument is instead best understood against the background of an Aristotelian view of the priority of real being over time. The essay also shows how this alternative interpretation can help to shed new light on the difference between Leibnizian forces and Aristotelian powers, as well as on Leibniz’s famous claim that accounting for force leads us beyond the mechanistic corporeal realm.


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Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 14:38