It has been proposed that reoffending could be reduced by manipulating
the neural underpinnings of offenders’ criminogenic mental features with
what have been called neurocorrectives. The legitimacy of such use of
neurotechnology – criminal neurorehabilitation, as the use is called –
is usually seen to presuppose valid consent by the offenders subjected
to it. According to a central criticism of nonconsensual criminal
neurorehabilitation, nonconsensual use of neurocorrectives would express
a degrading attitude towards offenders. In this article, I consider
this criticism of nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation. By using
cases of autonomous persons who lead a subservient existence as an
example, I propose that nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation need
not express a more degrading attitude towards offenders than consensual
criminal neurorehabilitation. The argument of this article does not show
that nonconsensual criminal neurorehabilitation is morally or legally
acceptable. Yet, in view of the argument, criticizing nonconsensual
criminal neurorehabilitation for expressing a degrading attitude towards
offenders is not compatible with simultaneously endorsing consensual
criminal neurorehabilitation.