The Causal beliefs of European Union foreign policy: An Operational code analysis of the high representatives in 2000 – 2018
: Rantanen, Teemu
: Turku
: 2025
: Turun yliopiston julkaisuja - Annales Universitatis Turkunesis B
: 721
: 978-952-02-0172-2
: 978-952-02-0173-9
: 0082-6987
: 2343-3191
: https://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-02-0173-9
t has been argued that one of the key requirements for the European Union to become an effective international actor is the creation of a strategic culture for its foreign policy. The present study investigates whether the foundations for this kind of strategic culture, understood here as a shared, institutionalised belief system, already exist in the Union’s foreign policy practices. Furthermore, the study seeks to develop further the methods for analysing foreign policy beliefs with a scrutiny of the method of operational code analysis.
This study examines the belief systems that shape and direct foreign policy as they are reproduced in foreign policy discourses. The study reviews the main elements of EU foreign policy beliefs and tracks their continuation and change during the years 2000 – 2018. The framework of operational code analysis is used to identify these foreign policy beliefs from the speeches of three High Representatives of the Union: Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton, and Federica Mogherini. The study identifies the beliefs in the operational code framework as representing a particular class of beliefs: causal beliefs. These causal beliefs concern the nature of the political universe and the best means to achieve political goals in it.
The work contributes to academic discussion with two important points: one methodological and one substantial. Regarding methodology, it tests and compares two different forms of operational code analysis: quantitative and qualitative. The study shows how they operate as methods for analysing foreign policy beliefs, and what kind of elements affect their particular use both together and separately. They are shown to serve different purposes and produce different kinds of knowledge about the strategic beliefs of the subject. The study argues that the quantitative operational code analysis typically focuses on certain forms of power while neglecting others, because of the conceptualisation of power taken in the analytical framework. Utilisation of qualitative operational code analysis allows a move beyond this narrower perspective and inclusion of indirect and more nuanced means of power to analysis. The study suggests that both forms can be used effectively for foreign policy analysis, separately or in combination. However, understanding the differences in the points of view of these methods is vitally important for their successful application.
Substantially, the study evaluates the level of institutionalisation of the key causal beliefs in EU foreign policy and offers a detailed look on the main elements of these beliefs. Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses portray the EU’s operational code beliefs as highly stable. The results indicate that the core operational code beliefs have been institutionalised into the Union’s foreign policy thinking as a strategic culture that guides its external action. This shared belief system is built on a strong identity of the EU as a cooperative power. A belief in cooperation as an effective means of influencing others and pursuing political goals characterises the Union as an international actor. However, the prominent role of both the use of conditionality and the use of combined means, including coercive means such as economic sanctions, indicates a more complex approach to the use of power in the Union’s operational code. Other major elements in the part of the operational code concerning the Union’s means to pursue its foreign policy goals include notable use of indirect power through the utilisation of multilateral institutions and normative structures, and a tendency towards risk aversion. The political universe in the EU’s operational code is perceived as predominantly friendly, but increasingly unpredictable and with a growing opposition to the values promoted by the Union. However, this negative development is balanced by optimism regarding the Union’s own development. Through its institutional development, the Union is seen to strengthen itself as an international actor and to increase its own control over its political environment.