Pairwise Voting Rules in Restricted Domains: The Disappearance and Persistence of Some Monotonicity Paradoxes
: Hannu Nurmi
: Nguyen N., Kowalczyk R., Mercik J., Motylska-Kuźma A.
: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
: Berlin
: 2020
: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence
: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXV
: 3
: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
: 12330
: 35
: 38
: 51
: 978-3-662-62244-5
: 978-3-662-62245-2
: 2190-9288
: 1611-3349
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62245-2_3
: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-662-62245-2
The property of participation is satisfied by a voting rule if under no circumstances it is to thebenefit of a voter to abstain rather than vote according to his/her preferences. By Moulin's result of 1988 all voting rules that always elect a Condorcet winner when one exists fail on the property of participation \cite{Moulin 1988}. Focusing on preference profiles that are restricted to those having a Condorcet winner we ask whether Moulin's result holds under these preference profiles. It turns out that while some types of monotonicity paradoxes vanish in the Condorcet domains, others persist.
