A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä
Born which Way? ADHD, Situational Self-Control, and Responsibility
Tekijät: Polaris Koi
Kustantaja: SPRINGER
Julkaisuvuosi: 2020
Lehti:Neuroethics
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimiNEUROETHICS
Lehden akronyymi: NEUROETHICS-NETH
Sivujen määrä: 14
ISSN: 1874-5490
eISSN: 1874-5504
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-020-09439-3
Rinnakkaistallenteen osoite: https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/48730927
Tiivistelmä
Debates concerning whether Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) mitigates responsibility often involve recourse to its genetic and neurodevelopmental etiology. For such arguments, individuals with ADHD have diminished self-control, and hence do not fully satisfy the control condition for responsibility, when there is a genetic or neurodevelopmental etiology for this diminished capacity. In this article, I argue that the role of genetic and neurobiological explanations has been overstated in evaluations of responsibility. While ADHD has genetic and neurobiological causes, rather than embrace the essentialistic notion that it directly diminishes self-control and, therefore, responsibility, we ought to think of ADHD as constraining only some self-control practices. In particular, situational self-control strategies remain feasible for people with ADHD. However, not all individuals haveaccessto these strategies. I suggest a way to evaluate responsibility in terms of situational rather than agential pleas, which tracks whether the individual had access to self-control behaviors. While I restrict my discussion to ADHD, the access-based approach is also relevant for assessments of responsibility for other cases where self-control failures are at stake.
Debates concerning whether Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) mitigates responsibility often involve recourse to its genetic and neurodevelopmental etiology. For such arguments, individuals with ADHD have diminished self-control, and hence do not fully satisfy the control condition for responsibility, when there is a genetic or neurodevelopmental etiology for this diminished capacity. In this article, I argue that the role of genetic and neurobiological explanations has been overstated in evaluations of responsibility. While ADHD has genetic and neurobiological causes, rather than embrace the essentialistic notion that it directly diminishes self-control and, therefore, responsibility, we ought to think of ADHD as constraining only some self-control practices. In particular, situational self-control strategies remain feasible for people with ADHD. However, not all individuals haveaccessto these strategies. I suggest a way to evaluate responsibility in terms of situational rather than agential pleas, which tracks whether the individual had access to self-control behaviors. While I restrict my discussion to ADHD, the access-based approach is also relevant for assessments of responsibility for other cases where self-control failures are at stake.
Ladattava julkaisu This is an electronic reprint of the original article. |  |
Turun yliopiston Tutkimustietojärjestelmän portaali