Voting paradoxes have played an important role in the theory of voting. They typically say very little about the circumstances in which they are particularly likely or unlikely to occur. They are basically existence findings. In this article we study some well known voting paradoxes under the assumption that the underlying profiles are drawn from the Condorcet domain, i.e. a set of preference profiles where a Condorcet winner exists. The motivation for this restriction is the often stated assumption that profiles with a Condorcet winner are more likely than those without it. We further restrict the profiles by assuming that the starting point of our analysis is that the Condorcet winner coincides with the choice of the voting rule under scrutiny. The reason for making this additional restriction is that - intuitively - the outcomes that coincide with the Condorcet winner make those outcomes stable and, thus, presumably less vulnerable to various voting paradoxes. It will be seen that this is, indeed, the case for some voting rules and some voting paradoxes, but not for all of them.