The philosophy of David Hume is often presented as sceptical, even though the aspects of his philosophy may be said to be just a starting point for his constructive philosophy, the goals of which are primarily moral-philosophical. In jurisprudence, Hume is mostly known for “Hume’s law”, the logical maxim according to which no set of nonmoral premises can entail a moral conclusion, which is taken to mark an absolute distinction between “is” and “ought”. Crossing this division would result in “naturalistic fallacy”. However, Hume’s own moral philosophy is built on bridging this gap. The article examines Hume’s moral philosophy and how the division between “is” and “ought” should be understood from this point of view in jurisprudence and legal decision-making. It is argued that the sharp division, still largely maintained in theory if not in practice, is not nearly as significant as it has often been held to be, and there is, in general, no need to maintain such an ontological division.