A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials
Authors: Tukiainen, Janne; Blesse, Sebastian; Bohne, Albrecht; Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Jaaskelainen, Jan; Luukinen, Ari; Sieppi, Antti
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2024
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal name in source: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
Article number: ARTN 106716
Volume: 227
ISSN: 0167-2681
eISSN: 1879-1751
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106716
Web address : https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106716
Self-archived copy’s web address: https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/477044820
While effective bureaucracy is crucial for state capacity, its decision-making remains a black box. We elicit preferences of 900+ real-world public procurement officials in Finland and Germany. This is an important pursuit as they report having sizeable discretion and minimal extrinsic incentives. Through conjoint experiments, we identify the relative importance of multiple features of procurement outcomes. Officials prioritize avoiding unexpectedly high prices over seeking low prices. Avoiding winners with prior bad performance is the most important feature. Officials avoid very low competition, while litigation risks and regional favoritism matter less. Preferences and office interests appear well-aligned among bureaucrats.
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Funding information in the publication:
Blesse is thankful for funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under project ID 139943784—SFB 884. Blesse, Bohne and Giuffrida are thankful to the Leibniz Association for its support through the project Market Design by Public Authorities. Jääskeläinen and Tukiainen are thankful for funding by the Yrjö Jahnsson foundation. Tukiainen is thankful to the Academy of Finland project funding 340045, and the European Union (ERC, INTRAPOL, 101045239). Views and opinions expressed are only those of the authors, however, and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
All authors are thankful for EconPol funding. All authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.
