A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
Tekijät: Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi
Kustantaja: Elsevier
Julkaisuvuosi: 2020
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Lehden akronyymi: Games Econ Behav
Vuosikerta: 121
Aloitussivu: 108
Lopetussivu: 116
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.006
Verkko-osoite: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562030021X
Rinnakkaistallenteen osoite: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/210678/7/210678.pdf
We study the relationship between the two-agent implementation problem and the concept of interim efficiency of Holmström and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environments with private values and independent types. We present a general property, called closure under interim utility equivalence,
and show it is sufficient for the implementation of social choice
functions. This condition, when combined with another property, called interim inseparability,
is also sufficient for the implementation of essentially single-valued
social choice sets. The characterization results are then examined in a
variety of environments.
