This study belongs firmly to the
genre of metaphilosophy, as it reflects on topics pertaining to the subject
matter, method and aim of philosophy itself by using philosophy’s own usual
tools and approaches. The contents of this study are divided into four main
chapters, which have their own specific topics and goals.

In the first chapter the various
manifestations of philosophy’s multifaceted identity are under focus. We can
clarify the diversity evident in philosophy by introducing the notion of
conception of philosophy. These are sets of philosophical theses, which present
us with their disinctive takes on philosophy’s topics, methods and purposes.
Conceptions of philosophy must, however, be strictly separated from other
related phenomena (such as schools, traditions and movements), which are in
their own ways involved in creating the pluralism existing in philosophy. To
close the chapter I argue for the importance of these themes.

The second chapter examines the
distinctive point of view and aim of metaphilosophical reflection and
chronicles its past. I also defend the value of this inquiry. Although
metaphilosophising as a form of philosophical research has a long past, it has
only recently emerged as its own distinct branch in philosophy. Thus
philosophers still use this name in numerous different ways, and there has not
previously been many in-depth overviews of the nature of metaphilosophical reflection
itself. To remedy this situation, I clarify the nature of metaphilosophy as a ”philosophy
of philosophy” of sorts, which is best viewed as an internal enterprise
operating within the bounds of philosophy proper. I also examine the potential
problematics inherent in this arrangement.

The third chapter presents as a
metaphilosophical case study the so-called naturalism-question. This issue
pertains to the way how to properly construe the role, province and stature of
philosophy in relation to the undertakings of empirical special sciences.
However, in the discussions between naturalists and anti-naturalists (who are
in this work represented by advocates of the view known as metaphilosophical
rationalism), there exists misunderstandings and toxic forms of rhetoric. I
point out these aspects in hopes of making them more apparent. At the chapter’
end I also consider the significance of the naturalismquestion for the near
future of philosophy.

The fourth chapter studies the
methodology of the so-called armchair philosophy, that is, intuitions and the
thought experiments which are used to elicit and articualte such intuitions.
Despite the attention these methods have received in the recent
metaphilosophical literature, there still exists confusions and disagreements
in this topic. I hope to set at least few of these issues straight with my
metaphilosophical examination of these themes.