On the Function and Nature of Historical Counterfactuals. Clarifying Confusions





Virmajoki Veli

PublisherBrill

2024

Journal of the Philosophy of History

18

1872-261X

1872-2636

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341519

https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341519

https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/393477905



In this article, I analyze historical counterfactuals. Historical counterfactuals are conditional statements in which the antecedent refers to some change in the past. We ask what would have happened, had that change occurred. I discuss the nature of such counterfactuals. I then identify important functions that historical counterfactuals have. I point out that they are at the heart of explanations and, therefore, reveal issues related to contingency and actual history. I then discuss counterfactual reasoning in historiography. I argue that the problem of suitable antecedent conditions has been exaggerated, and more serious issues concern the tracking of counterfactual scenarios. Throughout the paper, I argue that the interventionist way of thinking about historical counterfactuals clarifies both historical explanations and the nature of historical counterfactuals and should be adopted as the standard. I conclude by noting that historical counterfactuals may not fundamentally differ from more familiar forms of historiography.


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