A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
A critical take on procreative justice
Authors: Räsänen Joona, Bengtson Andreas, Cossette-Lefebvre Hugo, Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Publishing place: Hoboken
Publication year: 2024
Journal: Bioethics
Journal name in source: BIOETHICS
Journal acronym: BIOETHICS
Volume: 38
Issue: 4
First page : 367
Last page: 374
Number of pages: 8
ISSN: 0269-9702
eISSN: 1467-8519
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13274
Web address : https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13274
Self-archived copy’s web address: https://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/387310498
Abstract
Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways.
Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways.
UTU Research Portal