In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant
distinguishes two viewpoints on the world. The first, “determining” perspective
arises out of cognitive judgments that subsume particulars under conceptual
rules. The second, “reflective” perspective sees the represented manifold as a
purposive whole without having a concept under which to subsume it ready at
hand. Kant’s paradigm example of the latter perspective is the judgment of
beauty. This paper argues that Wittgenstein drew a similar distinction in the
early 1930s. In an early discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein distinguishes
two perspectives on grammar. The first, “discursive” perspective treats grammar
as a conceptually formulated system of rules. The second, “intuitive”
perspective “overlooks”, or surveys a grammatical system as a whole. Wittgenstein’s
description of the latter perspective resembles Kant’s account of the
reflective perspective. In accordance with Kant, Wittgenstein also connects the
“intuitive” perspective to aesthetics. In what is perhaps his most sustained
discussion of aesthetics, Wittgenstein defends a conception of aesthetic
judgment as normative yet partly founded on a subjective response arising from
looking at an aesthetic system as a whole. Such a normative yet partly
subjective judgment is also involved in our grasp of grammar.