In the end‐of‐life context, alleviation of the suffering of a distressed patient is usually
seen as a, if not the, central goal for the medical personnel treating her. Yet it has also
been argued that suffering should be seen as a part of good dying. More precisely, it
has been maintained that alleviating a dying patient’s suffering can make her unable to
take care of practical end‐of‐life matters, deprive her of an opportunity to ask questions
about and find meaning in and for her existence, and detach her from reality. In
this article, I argue that the aims referred to either do not support suffering or are
better served by alleviating it. When the aims would be equally well served by enduring
suffering and relieving it, the latter appears to be the preferable option, given that
the distress a patient experiences has no positive intrinsic value. Indeed, as the suffering
can be very distressing, it may not be worth bearing even if that was the best way
to achieve the aims: the distress can sometimes be bad enough to outbalance the
worth of achieving the goals. Having considered an objection to the effect that a patient
can have a self‐regarding moral duty to endure the distress she faces at the end
of life, I conclude that the burden of proof is on the side of those who maintain that the
suffering experienced at the end of life ought to be endured as a part of dying well.