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A Dynkin game with asymmetric information
Tekijät: Lempa J, Matomaki P
Kustantaja: TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Julkaisuvuosi: 2013
Journal: Stochastics: An International Journal of Probability and Stochastic Processes
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimi: STOCHASTICS-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROBABILITY AND STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
Lehden akronyymi: STOCHASTICS
Vuosikerta: 85
Numero: 5
Aloitussivu: 763
Lopetussivu: 788
Sivujen määrä: 26
ISSN: 1744-2508
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17442508.2012.655279
Tiivistelmä
We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time, which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.
We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time, which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.
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