A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
A Dynkin game with asymmetric information
Authors: Lempa J, Matomaki P
Publisher: TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Publication year: 2013
Journal: Stochastics: An International Journal of Probability and Stochastic Processes
Journal name in source: STOCHASTICS-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROBABILITY AND STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
Journal acronym: STOCHASTICS
Volume: 85
Issue: 5
First page : 763
Last page: 788
Number of pages: 26
ISSN: 1744-2508
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17442508.2012.655279
Abstract
We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time, which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.
We study a Dynkin game with asymmetric information. The game has a random expiry time, which is exponentially distributed and independent of the underlying process. The players have asymmetric information on the expiry time, namely only one of the players is able to observe its occurrence. We propose a set of conditions under which we solve the saddle point equilibrium and study the implications of the information asymmetry. Results are illustrated with an explicit example.
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