Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche hold very different views on what is the outcome of moral growth or what is the nature of moral maturity. For Nietzsche, a Kantian mature person, who follows universal ethical duties, is a prison of slave-morality. Only the Übermensch is a mature person. For Schopenhauer, a truly mature person is a holy ascetic who has developed his virtues of pity and compassion (Mitleid) to perfection. In this article, we consider whether there is something or nothing to be learnt from Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s ideas of moral growth regarding the Kohlberg-Gilligan debate on moral development. According to Schopenhauer, the source of morality is our natural feelings of pity and compassion. These basic feelings are in contradiction with another basic strive called “will-to-live”. The will-to-live is the ultimate thing-in-itself. To deny the will is the same as denying the will-to-live, which is for Schopenhauer the purpose of moral growth. The will is the source of all suffering, and a person who is free from willing is at the highest state of morality. The road from egoism to a total denial of the will-to-live can be understood as the Schopenhauerian theory of moral development. Nietzsche divides morality into two categories: master-morality and slave-morality. Nietzsche calls the slave-morality also “herd-morality” or morality of resentment, because it is the morality of masses. The master-morality makes a difference between the good and the bad, or between “life-affirming” and “life-denying”. Wealth, strength, health, and power count as good, while bad is associated with the poor, weak, sick, and pathetic. To the slave-morality belongs the difference between good and evil. Good is associated with other-worldliness, charity, piety, meekness, and submission. Evil is seen as worldly, cruel, selfish, wealthy, and aggressive. The Nietzschean master-morality represents the will to power through revaluating all the values. The opposite of the will to power is asceticism, which means the denial of life — and for Nietzsche, that is not a life for the Übermensch. The Übermensch has no pity or other weak sentiments. In this article, we try to reveal what could be — if any — Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s positive contribution to the theory of moral growth.