We   compare   Russian   nuclear   energy   diplomacy   towards  
Finland  and  Hungary,  where  the  Russian  state  corporation 
Rosatom intends to build nuclear power plants by the 2020s.
Russian nuclear energy diplomacy features Rosatom working
with  other  state  institutions,  its  own  subsidiaries  and  an 
extensive  network  of  companies  and  R&D  actors  to  support 
Russian nuclear power projects abroad. Using the structuration
approach,  we  find  three  interests  driving  such  diplomacy: 
energy business and associated profits; modernization of the
Russian  economy,  including  the  diversification  of  its  export 
structure;  while  foreign  policy  interests  are  also  involved, 
considering  the  constraints  emerging  in  EU-Russia  energy 
diplomacy in the oil and gas sectors, including the sanctions
since  2014.  Some  domestic  actors  in  Finland  and  Hungary 
make the linkage between nuclear energy and foreign policy
as  explicit  as  do  some  western  commentators.  Seeking  to 
pursue  these  interests,  Russian  actors  must  accommodate 
their  considerable  assets  to  the  structural  constraints  they 
encounter  in  the  target  countries.  We  identify  four  structural 
dimensions  The  Russian  actors  are  well  endowed  as  regards 
the   resources,   technology,   and   infrastructure   dimension;  
and    the    dimension    of    finance,    business    models,    and   
markets.  However,  on  the  institutional  dimension  they  face 
a  less  controllable  environment.  Regarding  the  ecological 
dimension,  they  must  conform  to  local  safety  requirements. 
In   both   cases,   Russian   actors   were   able   to   strengthen  
perceptions of joint interests with actors in the target country
facilitating  the  nuclear  power  plant  projects,  thereby  paving 
the way for the use of soft power.