A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
Collateral in credit rationing in markets with asymmetric information
Authors: Juha-Pekka Niinimäki
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2018
Journal: Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
Volume: 68
First page : 97
Last page: 102
Number of pages: 6
ISSN: 1062-9769
eISSN: 1878-4259
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2017.10.001(external)
Web address : https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2017.10.001(external)
We study an incentive model of lending in which a borrower can pledge a personal asset as outside collateral. We examine how the value of the collateral affects the borrower’s incentives and the lender’s returns. In some scenarios moral hazard is avoided without the collateral but the introduction of the collateral may generate negative incentives. The borrower attempts to save his collateral asset by gambling for resurrection with the project output or by gambling with the value of the collateral. These negative incentives make credit rationing optimal. The findings provide recommendations on the optimal use of collateral.