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Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
Tekijät: Ville Korpela
Kustantaja: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Julkaisuvuosi: 2014
Journal: Social Choice and Welfare
Vuosikerta: 43
Numero: 3
Aloitussivu: 647
Lopetussivu: 658
Sivujen määrä: 12
ISSN: 0176-1714
eISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0792-0
Verkko-osoite: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-014-0792-0
Tiivistelmä
We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, 2012) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems
We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen (Game Econ Behav 74:154–169, 2012) in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems
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