A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä
Eduskunnan ristiriitaulottuvuudet täysistuntoäänestysten valossa vuosien 1991-2010 valtiopäivillä
Tekijät: Pajala Antti
Kustantaja: Valtiotieteellinen Yhdistys
Julkaisuvuosi: 2012
Journal: Politiikka
Vuosikerta: 54
Numero: 2
Aloitussivu: 103
Lopetussivu: 118
eISSN: 2669-8617
Verkko-osoite: https://journal.fi/politiikka/article/view/60123
Tiivistelmä
I analyse plenary votes taken in Eduskunta using the Optimal Classification scaling method by Poole (2005).The data cover five electoral terms during 1991–2010. The analyses result in a structure of political dimensionality and the ideal points of the Members of Parliament for each electoral term. The eigenvalues produced by the scaling procedure indicate that during each electoral term Eduskunta is primarily one dimensional and only weak traces of a possible second dimension exist. The most important dimension regarding each electoral term turns out to be the government–opposition division while it is hard to provide sensible interpretations for the second dimensions, which at best reflect a weak left–right division. The scaling method is found to perform poorly in a case where political party groups’ voting cohesion is extremely high.
I analyse plenary votes taken in Eduskunta using the Optimal Classification scaling method by Poole (2005).The data cover five electoral terms during 1991–2010. The analyses result in a structure of political dimensionality and the ideal points of the Members of Parliament for each electoral term. The eigenvalues produced by the scaling procedure indicate that during each electoral term Eduskunta is primarily one dimensional and only weak traces of a possible second dimension exist. The most important dimension regarding each electoral term turns out to be the government–opposition division while it is hard to provide sensible interpretations for the second dimensions, which at best reflect a weak left–right division. The scaling method is found to perform poorly in a case where political party groups’ voting cohesion is extremely high.