A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

Social choice, stable outcomes and deliberative democracy




AuthorsNurmi Hannu

PublisherDe Gruyter Poland, Sciendo

Publishing placeVarsova

Publication year2022

JournalControl and Cybernetics

Volume51

Issue2

First page 137

Last page149

eISSN2720-4278

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2478/candc-2022-0011

Web address https://doi.org/10.2478/candc-2022-0011

Self-archived copy’s web addresshttps://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/175928453


Abstract

It has turned out that all voting rules fail on some intuitively plausible desiderata. This has led some political scientists to argue that the notion of the will of the people is profoundly ambiguous and the absence of voting equilibria a generic state of affairs. As a constructive remedy to this some authors have introduced the idea of deliberative democracy.  This view of democracy has much to recommend itself, most importantly the emphasis on individuals in devising the decision alternatives. Some empirical evidence also suggests that the deliberative institutions provide an escape from some of the most notorious incompatibility results in social choice theory. We shall critically examine this suggestion. The view emerging from this examination is that social choice theory and deliberative democracy are complementary, not competing approaches to democratic decision making.


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