Emotions are a necessary constituent of moral agency, and bear a deep impact on moral decision-making. Yet, their relevance in animal ethics has remained without sufficient focus, which is arguably one of the reasons why the theories of animal ethics are not always practically persuasive. This chapter suggests that, in order for animals to gain more serious, practically applied moral attention, it would be fruitful to cultivate reflective empathy. Reflective empathy combines first-order methods of empathy (such as perception and affective resonation) with second-order reflection, thereby offering a method of recognising how and why we empathise with given animals, and how we could broaden our empathic ability. It is also suggested that the second-order nature of reflective empathy is best supported by two further mental capacities: attention and holistic knowledge (knowledge Sub Specie Aeternitatis). The main argument is that reflective empathy, together with attention and holistic knowledge as its two constituents, renders animal ethics more affectively persuasive.