Article or data-article in scientific journal (B1)

Investors Reaction to the Disclosure of CEO Compensation




List of Authors: Gholami Moghaddam Faezah, Rajabalizadeh Javad, Hesarzadeh Reza

Publication year: 2019

Journal acronym: Iranian Journal of Investment Knowledge

Volume number: 9

Issue number: 33

URL: jik.srbiau.ac.ir/article_15666.html


Abstract

In recent years, increasing conflict agencies have caused legislators to impose stricter requirements on executive compensation disclosure. However, theoretically and experimentally, compensation disclosure is one of the challenging issues. The purpose of this study is to investigate investors' reactions to chief executive officer (CEO) compensation disclosure. Therefore, the present study by using the framework of Kelly and Seow (2016), investigates investors' reactions to evaluate different scenarios. In this regard, three types of questionnaires were issued with the disclosure criteria of managers' bonuses, disclosure of high compensation to managers, and disclosure of the rewards ratio of managers to employees, and the survey of 225 students of financial sciences was an indicator for the investor. Results show that the executive compensation disclosure to employees receive with executive compensation disclosure in similar firms is better than the other scenarios. Because this scenario has a positive effect on investor perception of "fairness compensation, the company's ability to attract and retain the CEO and potential investment opportunities".


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