There has been widespread concern about the recent introduction of the suspension of citizenship in Hungarian law. The new institution has been seen as worrying both from the perspective of the rule of law and the security of rights protections afforded by Hungarian citizenship, and with regard to the general coherence and intelligibility of the concept of suspending citizenship. This article intervenes in the debate on the suspension of citizenship in four ways. First, it describes the new rules on suspension in the context of Hungarian citizenship law. Second, it argues that ‘suspension’ is best understood as a type of citizenship revocation: both the novelty and the unintelligibility of the concept are strongly overstated. Viewed against the backdrop of a still-expanding European legislative push for denationalization and citizenship revocation, Hungarian laws are, in fact, quite humane and respectful of the right to a nationality. Third, it argues that the new Hungarian laws are nevertheless badly conceived and drafted, resulting in obvious conflicts with EU law on EU citizenship. Finally, the article considers the ways in which suspension interacts with the temporal, spatial and other structural institutions around citizenship.