A3 Refereed book chapter or chapter in a compilation book
Representation and objective reality
Authors: Sinokki, Jani; Lähteenmäki, Vili
Editors: Lähteenmäki, Vili; Marrama, Oberto; Sinokki, Jani
Edition: 1st Edition
Publisher: Routledge
Publication year: 2026
Book title : Cartesianism and Philosophy of Mind
Series title: Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy
First page : 35
Last page: 54
ISBN: 978-1-032-85307-9
eISBN: 978-1-003-51758-0
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003517580-4
Publication's open availability at the time of reporting: No Open Access
Publication channel's open availability : No Open Access publication channel
Web address : https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003517580-4
Abstract
This chapter investigates Descartes’ theory of ideas by focusing on the distinctions he draws between different functions. It argues that Descartes is committed to a dual function of ideas: unifying the mind with its object and providing psychological and epistemic access to that object. Drawing on an analysis of Descartes’ terminology—especially his use of the terms “material,” “objective,” and “formal”—this chapter reconstructs a trichotomy underlying his conception of ideas. It aims to show how each term corresponds to a distinct perspective: ideas as mental operations, as unifications with objects, and as representations subject to truth and falsity. This framework is used to reinterpret Descartes’ responses to critics such as Arnauld and Desgabets and to reassess Margaret Wilson’s influential claim that Descartes’ view collapses into incoherence. This chapter ultimately defends the coherence of Descartes’ position by distinguishing misrepresentation from misattribution and by showing how the special status of the cogito reveals a case in which representation and objective reality converge, eliminating the possibility of error. © 2026 selection and editorial matter, Vili Lähteenmäki, Oberto Marrama, and Jani Sinokki; individual chapters, the contributors.
This chapter investigates Descartes’ theory of ideas by focusing on the distinctions he draws between different functions. It argues that Descartes is committed to a dual function of ideas: unifying the mind with its object and providing psychological and epistemic access to that object. Drawing on an analysis of Descartes’ terminology—especially his use of the terms “material,” “objective,” and “formal”—this chapter reconstructs a trichotomy underlying his conception of ideas. It aims to show how each term corresponds to a distinct perspective: ideas as mental operations, as unifications with objects, and as representations subject to truth and falsity. This framework is used to reinterpret Descartes’ responses to critics such as Arnauld and Desgabets and to reassess Margaret Wilson’s influential claim that Descartes’ view collapses into incoherence. This chapter ultimately defends the coherence of Descartes’ position by distinguishing misrepresentation from misattribution and by showing how the special status of the cogito reveals a case in which representation and objective reality converge, eliminating the possibility of error. © 2026 selection and editorial matter, Vili Lähteenmäki, Oberto Marrama, and Jani Sinokki; individual chapters, the contributors.
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