This research examines the influence of three CEO traits—managerial ability, overconfidence, and narcissism—on the strategic repetition of information in 10-K reports. It specifically explores how these traits impact the repetition of information from the note disclosures to the more discretionary Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section. We anchor our analysis in broad theoretical frameworks such as information asymmetry, agency costs, and signaling theory, which help elucidate the dynamics of CEO-driven communication strategies in financial reporting. These foundational theories are crucial for understanding how CEO traits might influence corporate transparency and the trust of shareholders and other stakeholders. Utilizing a comprehensive methodological approach including textual analysis and empirical investigation across a dataset of 10-K filings, this study reveals how CEO traits collectively impact the strategic repetition in disclosures, thereby influencing overarching financial reporting strategies.

This thesis comprises an introduction and three essays. The introduction outlines the background and rationale for investigating the influence of CEO traits on repetition. This section sets the stage by detailing the research objectives and questions, presenting a theoretical framework, and segmenting CEO traits for investigation. Essay 1 analyzes the relationship between CEO managerial ability and disclosure repetitiveness, applying management obfuscation theory and stakeholder theory. It finds that better managerial ability is associated with less repetition, suggesting a preference for clarity and substantive disclosure among more adept leaders. Essay 2 examines the effects of CEO overconfidence on disclosure repetitiveness, utilizing upper echelons theory and behavioral decision theory. It reveals that overconfident CEOs tend to decrease repetitiveness, potentially enhancing disclosure transparency. Essay 3 delves into the impact of CEO narcissism, employing agency theory and impression management theory, indicating that narcissistic CEOs have a tendency to increase repetitiveness, possibly as a strategy for impression management and to obscure unfavorable information. Taken together, managerial ability and overconfidence seem to drive clearer reporting, while narcissism introduces impression management via strategic repetition.

The findings contribute to the literature on financial disclosures, and on executive decision-making by highlighting the ways in which certain CEO traits together influence corporate communication strategies. This research enhances theoretical frameworks by integrating key foundational theories, including management obfuscation theory, stakeholder theory, and behavioral decision theory, while applying specific theories tailored to each Essay, as outlined. Supported by robust empirical evidence, this approach deepens our understanding of the complex relationship between executive personality traits and financial reporting strategies. Furthermore, this thesis addresses regulatory concerns regarding disclosure quality, offering implications for standard setters and practitioners seeking to improve the effectiveness of financial reporting. Through its exploration of the motives, methods, and impacts of strategic repetitive disclosures in 10-K reports from notes to the MD&A sections, this thesis underscores the significant role of CEO traits in influencing the transparency and integrity of corporate financial reporting.