A4 Article in conference proceedings

Pairwise Voting Rules in Restricted Domains: The Disappearance and Persistence of Some Monotonicity Paradoxes




List of Authors: Hannu Nurmi

Conference name: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence

Publisher: Springer-Verlag

Place: Berlin

Publication year: 2020

Journal: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence

Book title *: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXV

Title of series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Number in series: 12330

Volume number: 35

ISBN: 978-3-662-62244-5

eISBN: 978-3-662-62245-2

ISSN: 2190-9288

eISSN: 1611-3349

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62245-2_3

URL: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-662-62245-2


Abstract

The property of participation is satisfied by a voting rule if under no circumstances it is to thebenefit of a voter to abstain rather than vote according to his/her preferences. By Moulin's result of 1988 all voting rules that always elect a Condorcet winner when one exists fail on the property of participation \cite{Moulin 1988}. Focusing on preference profiles that are restricted to those having a Condorcet winner we ask whether Moulin's result holds under these preference profiles. It turns out that while some types of monotonicity paradoxes vanish in the Condorcet domains, others persist.



Last updated on 2021-24-06 at 09:08