A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä
Deliberative disagreement and compromise
Tekijät: Ian O'Flynn, Maija Setälä
Kustantaja: Routledge
Julkaisuvuosi: 2022
Journal: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimi: CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Lehden akronyymi: CRIT REV INT SOC POL
Vuosikerta: 25
Numero: 7
Aloitussivu: 899
Lopetussivu: 919
Sivujen määrä: 21
ISSN: 1369-8230
eISSN: 1743-8772
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2020.1737475
Tiivistelmä
Deliberative democracy entails a commitment to deciding political questions on their merits. To that end, people engage in an exchange of reasons in a shared endeavour to arrive at the right answer or the best judgement they can make in the circumstances. Of course, in practice a shared judgement may be impossible to reach. Yet while compromise may seem a natural way of dealing with the disagreement that deliberation leaves unresolved - for example, some deliberative theorists argue that a willingness to compromise manifests respect for the considered views of others, even as we continue to disagree with them - the relationship between deliberation and compromise is not as straightforward as one might think. To explain why, this paper contrasts conflicts of judgement with conflicts of preference, interest and value to show why greater attention needs to be paid to the character of the decision to be made.
Deliberative democracy entails a commitment to deciding political questions on their merits. To that end, people engage in an exchange of reasons in a shared endeavour to arrive at the right answer or the best judgement they can make in the circumstances. Of course, in practice a shared judgement may be impossible to reach. Yet while compromise may seem a natural way of dealing with the disagreement that deliberation leaves unresolved - for example, some deliberative theorists argue that a willingness to compromise manifests respect for the considered views of others, even as we continue to disagree with them - the relationship between deliberation and compromise is not as straightforward as one might think. To explain why, this paper contrasts conflicts of judgement with conflicts of preference, interest and value to show why greater attention needs to be paid to the character of the decision to be made.
Turun yliopiston Tutkimustietojärjestelmän portaali