A1 Vertaisarvioitu alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä lehdessä
Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations
Tekijät: Batrancea L., Nichita A., Olsen J., Kogler C., Kirchler E., Hoelzl E., Weiss A., Torgler B., Fooken J., Fuller J., Schaffner M., Banuri S., Hassanein M., Alarcón-García G., Aldemir C., Apostol O., Bank Weinberg D., Batrancea I., Belianin A., Bello Gómez F., Briguglio M., Dermol V., Doyle E., Gcabo R., Gong B., Ennya S., Essel-Anderson A., Frecknall-Hughes J., Hasanain A., Hizen Y., Huber O., Kaplanoglou G., Kudła J., Lemoine J., Leurcharusmee S., Matthiasson T., Mehta S., Min S., Naufal G., Niskanen M., Nordblom K., Öztürk E., Pacheco L., Pántya J., Rapanos V., Roland-Lévy C., Roux-Cesar A., Salamzadeh A., Savadori L., Schei V., Sharma M., Summers B., Suriya K., Tran Q., Villegas-Palacio C., Visser M., Xia C., Yi S., Zukauskas S., Batrancea L., Zukauskas S., Yi S., Xia C., Visser M., Villegas-Palacio C.
Kustantaja: Elsevier B.V.
Julkaisuvuosi: 2019
Journal: Journal of Economic Psychology
Tietokannassa oleva lehden nimi: Journal of Economic Psychology
Vuosikerta: 74
Sivujen määrä: 15
ISSN: 0167-4870
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.102191
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance
of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance
alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using
data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five
continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and
power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework,
increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion
across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political,
and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster
compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those
perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the
highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those
perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest
enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results
suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated
by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country
variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of
tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear
implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best
practices for tax collection.
