A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon




AuthorsJussi Jylkkä, Henry Railo

PublisherAcademic Press Inc.

Publication year2019

JournalConsciousness and Cognition

Journal name in sourceConsciousness and Cognition

Volume74

ISSN1053-8100

eISSN1090-2376

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.102779

Web address https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053810019301436

Self-archived copy’s web addresshttps://research.utu.fi/converis/portal/detail/Publication/41877432


Abstract

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we
can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the
experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that
experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact
with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be
observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap
between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms
stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct
based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it
models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap
between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this
approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an
experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We
argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the
empirical study of consciousness.


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Last updated on 2024-26-11 at 22:56