A1 Refereed original research article in a scientific journal
A Simple Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementation
Authors: Korpela Ville
Publisher: Elsevier
Publication year: 2013
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Journal acronym: J Econ Theory
Volume: 148
Issue: 5
First page : 2183
Last page: 2193
Number of pages: 11
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013
Abstract
In an important step forward Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.] showed that two properties - monotonicity and no veto power - are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to the vast literature that followed, this characterization has two major advantages: First, it is often easy to verify, and second, it has an elegant and simple interpretation. However, there does not exist a similar condition for social choice correspondences that are implementable in strong equilibrium. All existing characterizations are either hard to verify or apply only to comprehensive preference domains. In this paper we improve the situation by giving one such condition. Moreover, using well-known examples we show that this is a practical tool.
In an important step forward Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.] showed that two properties - monotonicity and no veto power - are together sufficient for Nash implementation. In contrast to the vast literature that followed, this characterization has two major advantages: First, it is often easy to verify, and second, it has an elegant and simple interpretation. However, there does not exist a similar condition for social choice correspondences that are implementable in strong equilibrium. All existing characterizations are either hard to verify or apply only to comprehensive preference domains. In this paper we improve the situation by giving one such condition. Moreover, using well-known examples we show that this is a practical tool.
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