A1 Journal article – refereed

On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity

List of Authors: Ari Maunu

Publisher: Philosophy documentation center

Place: Charlottesville, Virginia

Publication year: 2018

Journal: Journal of Philosophical Research

Volume number: 43

Number of pages: 8

ISSN: 1053-8364

eISSN: 2153-7984

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr2018918134

URL: https://www.pdcnet.org/jpr/content/jpr_2018_0043_0241_0248


There is a certain popular argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan and Saul Kripke, from the conjunction of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PInI, for short) and the Principle of the Necessity of Self-Identity to the Thesis of the Necessity of Identity. My purpose is to show that this argument does not work, not at least in the form it is often presented. I also give a correct formulation of the argument and point out that PInI is not even needed in the argument for the necessity of identity.

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Last updated on 2021-24-06 at 09:32