Desire and Good in Spinoza
: Olli Koistinen
: Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa
: New York
: 2014
: Essays on Spinoza's Ethcial Theory
: 978-0-19-965753-7
In this paper, my principal interest lies in uncovering Spinoza's reasons for holding this kind of 'desire first' view as well as to understand how, according to Spinoza, our motivation works. Spinoza says that 'From all this, then, it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good' (3p9s). It is quite puzzling what these above considerations are. My main claim is that Spinoza thought that motivation by pure goodness, instead of making agency possible, would pose a fundamental threat to agency; it would violate the unity of Spinoza’s agent where mind and body work together. Moreover, motivation by pure goodness is often seen as a necessary condition of freedom. Thus, Spinoza's reasons for thinking that there is no room for motivation by pure goodness also tells us a lot about his view of freedom.