Charles Taylor is famous for criticizing
the Kantian conception of recognition as mere respect. According to him, Kantians
place too much emphasis on the notion of individual autonomy and fail to
acknowledge persons’ dependence on their communities. In support of his view of
persons as essentially communal creatures, Taylor appeals to Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy and his account of linguistic understanding in particular. In
this paper, I argue that while Taylor’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later
account of understanding as rule-following succeeds in highlighting often
overlooked aspects of Wittgenstein’s later view, such as the communal and
embodied character of our linguistic interactions, his exclusive emphasis on
the dialogical character of the human subject is not consistent with
Wittgenstein’s own position. By bringing up Wittgenstein’s discussion of
religious faith, I argue that a mere reference to socially shared norms is not
enough to make sense of Wittgenstein’s own position. While the socially shared
practices provide a necessary background for understanding also in the case of
religion, religious faith further requires an aspect of personal commitment
that is not reducible to the shared norms of understanding.